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THE PIONEERS AND THE COMMON LAW.*
By Roscoe Pound**
Few institutions of the modern world show such persistence and
vitality as the common law. Indeed, persistence and vitality have
marked its history from the beginning. In the twelfth century it
came into conflict with the Church, the most powerful antagonist
of that time, and succeeded in establishing itself as the law of the
land. It is true a like struggle between state-law and church-law
went on all over Europe. But the canon law left much less mark
upon the law of England than upon the law of Continential Europe, and today there is nothing beyond a separate probate court
in most of our jurisdictions and a few peculiarities of probate
practice to remind us of the conflict. In the sixteenth century the
common law was again threatened by the onward march of the
Roman law in western Europe. Renaissance, Reformation and
Reception of Roman Law seemed, as Maitland has shown us, an irresistible conjunction. Elsewhere the local law gave way before it.
The common law of England was the only body of Germanic law
that withstood the movement and survived as a whole. Again, in
the seventeenth century, with the rise of absolute governments, the
common law came into conflict with the most powerful movement
of the time and emerged victorious. The contests between courts
and crown in Stuart England insured the survival in English public law and further development in American public law of the
*

An address delivered before the North Carolina Bar Association, July 1920.
Dean of the Law School, Harvard University.
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most characteristic of common-law institutions. In the new world,
at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the
nineteenth century came another conflict, to be spoken of presently,
which had for its result to make the common law of England a
law of the world. Still later in the ninteenth century, in the legislative reform movement, the common law was threatened by legislative activity, the capital fact, it has been said, in modern politics.
Yet as we look back over a century and a quarter of American state
legislation, we are bound to admit that it has wrought no essential
change in what truly goes to make up the common law.
Today, the common law imposes itself on the huge mass of legislation poured out by our law-making bodies and gives it form and
consistency. It has swallowed up and assimilated equity, admiralty and the law merchant. It has made the criminal equity of the
Star Chamber into a system of legal doctrine as to misdemeanors.
It gives unity to our rapidly growing body of judicial decision, despite the independent authority of the supreme courts of fortyeight states.
Nor is the common law less successful upon foreign ground or
in competition with foreign law. Wherever it has come in contact
with the rival law of the modern world, the outcome has been the
same. In Louisiana, the criminal law, the public law, the law of
torts, the law of corporations, the law merchant are thoroughly
Anglo-American; the common-law doctrine of precedents has been
received, and more and more the law is becoming Anglo-American
in substance, if Roman-French in its terminology. In Texas only
a few anomalies of procedure remind us that that domain was once
ruled by Roman-Spanish law. Only historians know that Michigan
and Wisconsin were once subject to the Custom of Paris. In Scotland the law has all but ceased to be Roman in more than its vocabulary. In South Africa, as judges reason and decide after the manner of common-law lawyers in the mere phrases of Roman-Dutch
law, a like movement is visibly in progress. In Porto Rico and ii
the Philippines the growing element and the aggressive element is
Anglo-American.
Moreover the characteristic common-law institution, the supremacy of law, in the form in which it has reached its highest development in America, is commending itself to the most diverse
peoples, when they find themselves living under written constitutions. Thus we find courts in South America deciding constitutional questions on the basis of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations; we
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find Dutch judges in South Africa, trained in Roman-Dutch law,
holding legislation void for infringing the fundamental law and
citing Marbury v. Madison on the same page with commentators on
the Pandects; we find continental publicists lamenting that their
polity does not provide for judicial interpretation of their constitutions.
There is the same unity of law in the common-law world that
there is in the Roman-law world; the unity of our law from Coke
to the present is as real as the unity of Roman law from Papinian
to the latest continental code. But this unity is in its spirit, in its
characteristic institutions, rather than in any fixed dogas or
settled doctrines. It is the spirit of our law that has made it a
law of the world; it is the spirit of our law that will endure. And
this spirit of English law, like the English people itself, is composite. One factor in making it was feudalism, whence we took the
idea of relation-from the analogy of the relation of lord and man
-and made it the most fruitful of our legal institutions, as the
double titles in our treatises and digests bear abundant witness. A
second factor was Puritanism, with its idea of consociation rather
than subordination and its rooted distrust of magisterial discretion.
A third factor was the body of politico-legal ideas developed in the
seventeenth-century contests between courts and crown, giving us
our American bills of rights and identification of the common-law
rights of Englishmen with the natural rights of man. A fourth
factor was the idealistic philosophy of the ninteenth century, the
formative period in which the common law of England became the
law of the new world; a philosophy which put the individual human
will at the very center of law and politics and confirmed and intrenched the individualism inherent in Germanic law, already fortified by Puritanism and given dogmatic form in the contest between courts and crown. Finally a fifth factor operated in the
new world, namely, the ideas and ideals of the pioneer. It is of this
factor and its effects upon our law that I would speak to you this
morning.
"There are features of American democracy," says Professor
Sumner, "which are inexplicable unless one understands .....
frontier society. Some of our greatest political abuses have come fromA
transferring to our now large and crowded cities maxims and
usages which were convenient and harmless in backwoods country
towns." This is no less true of many of our more serious legal
abuses. In particular many crudities in judicial organization and

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss1/2

4

Pound: The Pioneers and the Common Law
WEST

IBGINIA LAW QUARTEBLY

procedure are demonstrably legacies of the frontier. Moreover the
spirit of American law of the nineteenth century was sensibly affected by the spirit of the pioneer.
For most practical purposes American judicial history begins
after the Revolution. Administration of Justice in Colonial America was at first executive and legislative, and these types of nonjudicial justice persisted well into the last century. Again, with a
few conspicuous exceptions, the courts, before and for some time
after the Revolution were made up largely of untrained magistrates, who administered justice according to their common sense
and the light of nature, with some guidance from legislation. Until
the Revolution, in most of the Colonies it was not considered necessary or even expedient to have judges learned in the law. Of the
three justices of the Superior Court in New Hampshire after independence, one was a clergyman and another a physician. A judge
of the highest court of Rhode Island from 1814 to 1818, was a
blacksmith, and the chief justice of that state from 1819 to 1826
'was a farmer. When James Kent went upon the bench in New
York in 1791, he could say with entire truth: "There were no
reports or state precedents. The opinions from the bench were delivered ore tenus. We had no law of our own and nobody knew
'what [the law] was."
Our judicial organization, then, and the great body of our Ameri'can common law are the work of the last quarter of the eighteenth
century and the first half of the nineteenth century. On the other
hand our great cities and the social and legal problems to which
they give rise are of the last half of the nineteenth century, and indeed, the pressing problems do not become acute until the last quarter of that century. Our largest city now contains in three hundred and twenty-six square miles a larger and infinitely more varied population than the whole thirteen states contained when the
federal constitution was adopted. But New York City did not attain a population of one million till about 1880; and questions of
sanitation and housing were first urged after the Civil War. Such
commonwealths as the states west of the Missouri, each of which,
with a population not much exceeding a million, occupies an area
considerably greater than England and Wales, represent more
nearly the conditions for which the American judicial organization
was developed and for which the common law of England was mnade
over into a law for America.
To understand the administration of justice in American cities
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at the end of the nineteenth century, we must perceive the problems
of the administration of justice in a homogeneous pioneer or rural
community of the first half of the nineteenth century and the difficulties with which lawyers and jurists had to contend in meeting
those problems; we must perceive the attitude of such a community
toward legal procedure and its conception of the nature and function of a trial; we must perceive its attitude toward government
and administration and its rooted objection to supervision and restraint.
In the homogeneous pioneer or rural community of the first half
of the nineteenth century, the administration of justice involved
three problems: (1) To receive the English common law, or to
-findsomewhere else a basis for legal development, and to work out
upon the basis adopted a system of principles and rules adapted to
America; (2) to decentralize the administration of justice so as
to bring justice to every man's door; and (3) to devise a criminal
law and criminal procedure sufficient to deal with the occasional
criminal and the criminal of passion in a homogeneous community
of vigorous pioneer race, restrained already for the most part by
deep religious conviction and strict-moral training.
Chief of these problems was the one first named, the problem of
working out a system of rules and principles applicable to America.
It has long been the orthodox view that the colonies brought the
common law with them and that the English law has obtained in
this country from the beginning. But this is only a legal theory.
In fact the colonies began with all manner of experiments in administering justice without law and it was not till the middle of
the eighteenth century that the setting up of a system of courts and
the rise of a custom of studying law in England began to make
for a general administration of justice according to English law.
Just prior to the Revolution the wide-spread study of Blackstone,
whose first edition appeared in 1765, gave great impetus to the
reception of the common law. But as late as 1791 the law was so
completely at large in New York that the genius of a Kent was
needed to make the common law the law of that state.
After the Revolution the public was extremely hostile to England
and to all that was English and it was impossible for the common
law to escape the odium of its English origin. Judges and legislators were largely influenced by this popular feeling, and there
was no well-trained bar to resist it. In Philadelphia there were a
number of great lawyers, and there were good lawyers here and
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there throughout the country. But-the bulk of the profession was
made up of men who had come from the Revolutionary armies or
from the halls of the Continental Congress and had brought with
them many bitter feelings and often but scanty knowledge of the
law. It was natural that they should resent any serious investigation of the English authorities and perhaps endeavor to palliate.
their lack of information by a show of patriotism. Moreover a
large and influential party were enthusiastically attached to France
and not only denounced English law because it was English but
were inclined to call for a reception of French law. "The citation
of English decisions in the opinions of the courts," says Loyd,
"greatly exasperated the radical element. What were these precedents but the rags of despotism, who were the judges that rendered them but tyrants, sycophants, oppressors of the people and
enemies of liberty." The legal muckraker of today wields but a
feeble pen in comparison with his predecessor of the first half of the
last century. Under the influence of such ideas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Kentucky legislated against citation of English decisions in the courts. There was a rule against such citations in
New Hampshire, and more than one judge elsewhere had his fling
at the English authorities cited before him.
In part this opposition to the reception of the common law was
political. In large part, however, it was but a phase of the opposition of the frontiersman to scientific law. "The unthinking sons.
of the sagebrush," says Owen Wister, "ill tolerate anything which
stands for discipline, good order and obedience; and the man who
lets another command him they despise." In this they but repre-sent the feelings of the outposts of civilization everywhere. Aa
numbers increase there is a greater interest in general security.
But even then in the rude pioneer community the main point is to
keep the peace. Tribunals with power to enforce their judgments
are the most pressing need. There the refined, scientific law that
weighs and balances and deliberates and admits of argument is out
of place. A few simple rules, which everyone understands and a
swift and decisive tribunal best serve such a community. The customary law of the mining country from 1849 to 1866 largely repeated in this respect the experience of the Atlantic coast down
to the Revolution. In the next stage, as wealth increases, commerce
develops and society becomes more complex, the social interests in
the security of acquisitions and in the security of transactions call
imperatively for certainty and uniformity in the administration of
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justice and hence demand rules. But as we have seen, at the beginning of the nineteenth century American law was undeveloped
and uncertain. Administration of justice by lay judges, by
executive officers and by legislatures was crude, unequal, and often
partisan, if not corrupt. The prime requirement was rule and system, whereby to guarantee uniformity, equality and certainty.
And", since in the nature of things rules may not be laid down in
advance for every case, this meant that a scientific development of
law was inevitable.
Scientific development of -Americanlaw was retarded and even
warped by the frontier spirit surviving the frontier. The effects
of the opposition to an educated well-trained bar and to an independent experienced, permanent judiciary, which are legacies of
the Jefferson Brick era of American politics have been spoken of on
a former occasion. It will suffice here to recall the lack of interest
in universality and fostering of local peculiarities which are so
characteristic of our legal system. In part Puritanism must share
the responsibility. But in large part this spirit in American law is
a remnant of the frontier repugnance to scientific law and the insistence of the pioneer that his judges decide offhand without study
of what other judges may have done in European monarchies
or in effete communities to the eastward.
Again, the insistence upon the exact working out of rules and the
devotion to that end of the whole machinery of justice, which is so
characteristic of nineteenth-century America, is due in great part
to pioneer jealousy of governmental action. A pioneer or a
sparsely settled rural community is content with and prefers the
necessary minimum of government. The social interest in general
security requires a certain amount of governmental machinery.
It requires civil and criminal tribunals and rules and standards
of decision to be applied therein. But when every farm was for
the most part sufficient unto itself the chief concern was that the
governmental agencies set up to secure this social interest might
This pioneer
interfere unduly with individual interests.
with
the
Puritan idea
cooperated
action
of
governmental
jealousy
of consociation and the eighteenth-century idea of the rights of
man to exalt individual interests and put all possible checks upon
organized social control. There must be no magisterial, or adninistrative or judicial discretion. If men had to be governed, it
must be by known rules of the law.
Thus the chief problem of the formative period of our Ameri-
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can legal system was to discover and lay down rules; to develop
a system of certain and detailed rules which on the one hand would
meet the requirements of "American life, and, on the other hand,
would tie down the magistrate by leaving as little to his personal
judgment and discretion as possible, would leave as much as possible to the initiative of the individual and would keep down all
governmental and official action to the minimum required for the
harmonious co-existence of the individual and of the whole. This
problem determined the whole course of our legal development until
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Moreover, it determined our system of courts and our judicial organization. Above all
else we sought to insure an efficient machine for the development
of law by judicial decision. For a time this was the chief function
of our highest courts. For a time it was meet that John Doe suffer
for the commonwealth's sake. Often it was less important to decide the particular cause justly than to work out a sound and just
rule for the future. Hence for a century the chief energies of our
courts were turned toward the development of our case law and
the judicial hierarchy was set up with this purpose in view. It
could not be expected that a system of courts constructed chiefly
for such purposes would be able to deal effectively with the litigation of an urban community of today in which men look to legislatures to make rules and to courts to dispose of controversies.
A second problem in the formative period of American law was
to decentralize the administration of justice so as to bring justice
to every man in a sparsely settled community. The system of English courts at the Revolution was too arbitrary and involved to
serve as a model to be followed in detail in this country. But overlooking concurrent jurisdiction and some historical anomalies, a
general outline might be perceived which was the model of American judicial systems. To begin at the bottom, this was: (1) Local
peace magistrates and local inferior courts for petty causes; (2) a
central court of general jurisdiction at law and over crimes, with
provision for local trial of causes at circuit and review of civil
trials in bank in the central court; (3) a central court of equity in
which causes were heard in one place, though testimony was taken
in the locality; and (4) a supreme court of review. In the United
States all but five or six jurisdictions merged the second and third.
But with that salutary act of unification most of our jurisdictions
stopped. Indeed for a season there was no need for unification.
The defects in the foregoing scheme that appealed to the formative
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period of American judicial organization lay in the second and
third of the tribunals above described, namely the central court of
law and the central court of equity. In a country of long distances in a period of slow communication and expensive travel,
these central courts entailed intolerable hardship upon litigants.
It was a prime necessity to bring justice to every man's back door.
Accordingly in most states we set up a number of local courts of
general jurisdiction at law and in equity and our policy has been
one of multiplication of courts ever since. Nowhere is radical
change so much needed as in the organization of our courts. In almost all of our states the whole plan of judicial organization, adapted to a pioneer, rural, agricultural community of the first half of
the nineteenth century, is in the way of efficient disposition of the
litigation of the industrial and urban community of today.
A hundred years ago the problem seemed to be how to hold down
the administration of punitive justice and protect the individual
from oppression under the guise thereof, rather than how to make
the criminal law an effective agency for securing social interests.
English criminal law had been developed by judicial experience to
meet violent crimes in an age of force and violence. Later the nec.
essities of more civilized times had led to the development in the
court of Star Chamber of what is now the common law as to misdemeanors. Thus one part of the English law of crimes, as our
fathers found it, was harsh and brutal, as beffitted a law made
to put down murder by violence, robbery, rape and cattle stealing in a rough and ready community. Another part seemed to involve dangerous magisterial discretion, as might have been expected of a body of law made in the council of Tudor and Stuart
kings in an age of extreme theories of royal prerogative. The colonists hacd had experience of the close connection of criminal law with
politics. The pioneers who had preserved the memory of this experience were not concerned solely to do away with the brutality of
the old law as to felonies. Even more their constant fear of
political oppression through the criminal law led them and the
generation following, which had imbibed their ideas, to exaggerate
the complicated, expensive and dilatory machinery of a common
law prosecution, lest some safeguard of individual liberty be overlooked, to give excessive power to juries and to limit or even cut
off the power of the trial judge to control the trial and hold the
jury to its province. Nor did these enfeeblings of punitive justice
work much evil in a time and in places where crime except
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possibly the feud and the duel, on which the community looked
indulgently, was rare and abnormal, where, therefore the community did not require the swift-moving punitive justice, adjusted
to the task of enforcing a voluminous criminal code against a
multitude of offenders, which we demand today.
In Fennimore Cooper's Pioneers, the story opens with a striking
picture of central New York in 1823, a region which, as we are told,
had been a wilderness forty years before. Above all the author
attributes its prosperity to mild laws and to the spirit of the pioneer.
"The whole district," he says, "is hourly exhibiting how much can
be done, in even a rugged country, and with a severe climate, under
the dominion of mild laws, and where every man feels a direct
interest in the prosperity of a commonwealth of which he knows
himself a part." This is the spirit of our American common-law
polity. It presupposes a homogeneous population, which is jealous of its rights and in sympathy with the institutions of government. It presupposes a public which is intrinsically law abiding,
-even if inclined under provocation to vindicate public justice by
rough and ready methods. It presupposes a people which for the
most part will conform to rules of law when they are ascertained
and made known, so that the chief concern of courts and of the
-state is to settle what is the law. It presupposes a public which, in
the jury box, may be relied upon to enforce law and vindicate
justice between man and man intelligently and steadfastly. In
-other words, our common-law polity presupposes an American
farming community of the first half. of the nineteenth century; a
situation as far apart as the poles from what our legal system has
had to meet in the endeavor to administer justice to great urban
communities at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth

century.
American procedure, as it had developed through judicial de.cision, professional usage and legislation in the last century, shows
the hand of the pioneer even more plainly. It requires no great
study of our procedure to enable us to preceive that many of its
features, taking the country as a whole, were determined by the
conditions of. rural communities of one hundred years ago.
Many of its features are more appropriate to rural agricultural communities, where in intervals of work, the farmer, remote from the distractions of city life, found his theatre in the
'court house and looked to politics and litigation for amusement,
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than to modern urban communities. For instance, if I have read
American judicial biography aright, no small part of the exaggerated importance of the advocate in an American court of justice, of
the free rein, one might almost say the license, afforded him, while
the judge-must sit by and administer the rules of the combat, may
be traced to frontier conditions and frontier modes of thought.
When the farmers of the county have gathered to hear a great
forensic display they resent the direction of a verdict on a point
of law which cuts off the anticipated flow of eloquence. They resent judicial limitation of the time for argument, since the audience is to be considered as well as the court and the litigants.
Hence legislation tying down the trial judge in the interests of
untrammeled advocacy has its origin on the frontier. In particular
it may be shown that legislation restricting the charge of the court
has grown out of the desire of eloquent counsel, of a type so dear to
the pioneer community, to deprive not merely the trial judge
but the law of all influence upon trials and to leave everything
to be disposed of on the arguments. Moreover the frontier spectator in the forensic arena is not unlike his urban brother who
looks on at a game of base ball. He soon learns the points of the
game and knows and appreciates those who can play it.
In a book of reminiscences of an eminent lawyer there is a
,chapter entitled "Country Practice of the Law" which describes
the writer's experience in the western part of Massachusetts in
1861. He tells of a case where, in a prosecution for malicious injury to real estate, the case was that a wooden pump had been
taken out of a well in mere wanton mischief. counsel contended
that there was no malacious injury to real estate since the land
was not injured and the pump itself was personalty so that the comp1laint should have been for malicious injury to personal property.
To show this le argued that if a pump were realty there would
have to be a conveyance by deed of sale every time one was sold.
The magistrate was duly impressed and disciarged the accused,
but, being a conscientious man, proceeded to draw up a new complaint for malicious injury to personal property, upon which the
accused were re-arrested and put upon trial. Thereupon the same
counsel cited authorities, which were unanimous and conclusive,
that the pump in the well and annexed thereto for permanent use
was a fixture and so not personal property. The justice could
not deny the force of these decisions and was obliged to discharge
the accused upon this charge also, so that they escaped. But, we
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are told, "the magistrate enjoyed the joke upon himself as much
as the rest of us." "In fact," the author continues, "many of these
legal trials at the time were looked upon as huge jokes." Elsewhere he says "The whole contest was looked upon as a contest of
-wits, and if a person prevailed on account of knowing more than
the other party, it was not considered at all derogatory to his
character that he should use that knowledge in any way that was
best suited to the interest of his client." The ethics of such a
contest were the ethics of the professional baseball game. I need
not say that we have got well beyond this in professional ethics
today. But our procedure is still too much in the spirit of which
such advocacy is only an extreme manifestation.
The pioneer has influenced American judicial procedure in another way. On the frontier "everyone that was in distress and
everyone that was in debt and everyone that was discontented
gathered themselves" to begin life anew. Hence the attitude of
the pioneer was not favorable to the creditor seeking to enforce
his claim and the legislation of our pioneer jurisdictions was often
what might have been expected of the cave of Adullam. Extravagant powers in juries, curtailment of the powers of trial judges, an
abattis of procedural obstacles in the way of plaintiffs and a vested
right in errors of procedure on the part of defendants, all these institutions of American procedure grow out of the desire of the
frontier community to shield those who had fled thereto from the
exactions of their creditors. Later, when these communities had
borrowed heavily from their older neighbors in developing their
natural resources there was a strong local interest in preserving
these institutions. The very spirit of procedure in some parts of
the United States is so tinctured by frontier favor to debtors that
improvements in the direction of increased effectiveness in the judicial machinery can come but slowly. All this is quite alien to common-law modes of thought. But it has affected common-law procedure in America not a little.
What Professor Wigmore has called the sporting theory of justice, the idea that judicial administration of justice is a game to be
played to the bitter end, no doubt has its roots in Anglo-American
character and is closely connected with the individualism of the
common law. Yet it was fostered by the frontier attitude toward
litigation and it has flourished chiefly in recent times in tribunals
such as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals where the memory
of the frontier is still green. Moreover the rise of a class of habitu-
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al defendants, who are compelled to fall back upon procedural
niceties through the unwillingness of juries to judge them acording:
to law or even to do them justice, and the rise of a class of habitual plaintiff's lawyers, who rely on sympathy and prejudice rather
than law, and resent judicial interference to enforce law or preserve justice, have served to keep the spirit of frontier procedure
alive in a wholly different environment. Technical procedure is
neither a necessary check on the magistrate in the interest of
liberty nor a device to advance justice. It is a remnant of the
mechanical modes of trial in the beginnings of our law, developed
in the eighteenth-century in an age of formal over refinement,
fostered and even further developed in the pioneer or rural American communities of the last century, and turned to new uses in the
standing warfare between professional plaintiffs' lawyers and habitual defendants produced more recently by the conditions of tortlitigation in industrial and urban communities.
The nineteenth century aggravation of the common-law attitude
toward administration has been spoken of in other connections.
The political ideas of the seventeenth century growing out of the
contests between the courts and the crown, Puritanism, and the
political ideas of the eighteenth century all contributed to this attitude. But the exageration of it in the last century was in no small
degree the result of the pioneer's jealousy of government and administration and his rooted objection to supervision and restraint.
So also the jealousy of social legislation that developed in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, the insistence upon liberty of
contract and the right to pursue a lawful calling as guaranteed to
the individual and beyond the reach of legislation, result in part
from the feeling on the part of the pioneer that he should be let
alone and that he was ruled best when he was ruled least. In both
these instances, Puritan and pioneer, working with materials fashioned in the contests between courts and crown in the seventeenth
century, were able to put checks upon the enactment and enforcement of social legislation in this country for forty years after
English law making had definitely changed front and become collectivist.
How great a strain is put upon our legal and judicial institutions by the stamp of the pioneer, which they acquired in the forxnative period, may be seen by taking up the chief problems of administration of justice in the American city of today and perceiving
how little our institutions are adjusted to them.
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Demand for socialization of law, in the United States, has come
almost wholly, if not entirely, from the city. We have no class
of agricultural laborers, demanding protection. The call to protect men from themselves, to regulate housing, to enforce sanita"tion, to inspect the supply of milk, to prevent imposition upon
ignorant and caedulous immigrants, to regulate conditions and
hours of labor and provide a minimum wage, and the conditions
'that require us to heed this call, have come from the cities. But
'our legal system has had to meet this demand upon the basis of
rules and principles developed for rural communities or small
towns-from men who needed no protection other than against aggression and overreaching between equals dealing in matters which
each understood. Less than a generation ago we were echoing the
outcry of our fathers against governmental paternalism. Today,
not only have we swung over to this condition in large measure, as
our increasing apparatus of commissions and boards and inspectors testifies every day, but we are beginning to call for what has
been styled governmental maternalism to meet the conditions of
our great urban communities. Although much has been done and
comparatively rapid progress is now makilig, it is perhaps still
a chief problem to work out a system of legal administration of
justice which will secure the social interest in the moral and secial
life of every individual under the circumstances of the modern
eity, upon the basis of rules and principles devised primarily to
protect the interest in general security in a rural community of
seventy-five years ago.
Again, the demand for organization of justice and improvement
of legal procedure comes from our cities. It is a significant cir
'eumstance that in the debates upon this subject in the past fifteen
years in our bar associations national and state, the city lawyer
7has asserted that reform was imperative, while the country lawyer has contended that the evils were greatly exaggerated
and that grave changes were wholly unnecessary; the city lawyer
has been urging ambitious programs of reform and the country
lawyer has been defeating them. A modern judicial organization
and a modern procedure would, indeed, be a real service to country
as well as to city. But the pressure comes from the city, to which
'we are vainly endeavoring to adjust the old machinery. Courts
in our great cities as they are now organized are subjected to
almost overwhelming pressure by an accumulated mass of litigation. Usually they sit almost the year round, and yet they tire
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out parties and witnesses with long delays, and in some jurisdictions dispose of much of their business so hastily and imperfectly
that reversals and retrials are continually required. Such a condition may be found in the courts of general jurisdiction in
practically all of our cities. To deal adequately with the civil litigation of a city, to enforce the mass of police regulations required
by conditions of urban life, and to make the criminal law effective
to secure social interests, we must obviate waste of judicial power,
save time and conserve effort. There was no need of this when our
judicial system was framed. There is often little heed of it in the
country today. In the city the waste of time and money in doing
things that are wholly unnecessary results iir denial of justice.
A third problem of the administration of justice in the modern
city is to make adequate provision for petty litigation, to provide
for disposing quickly, inexpensively and justly of the litigation of
the poor, for the collection of debts in a shifting population, and
for the great volume of small controversies which a busy crowded
population, diversified in race and language necessarily engenders.
It is here that the administration of justice touches immediately
the greatest number of people. It is here that the great mass of
an urban population, whose experience of law in the past has been
too often experience only of the arbitrary discretion of police officers, might be made to feel that the law is a living force for securing their individual as well as their collective interests. For there
is a strong social interest in the moral and social life of the individual. If the will of the individual is subjected arbtrarily to the
will of others because the means of protection are too cumbersome and expensive to be available for one of his means against
an aggressive opponent who has the means or the inclination to
resist, there is an injury to society at large. The most real grievance of the mass of the people against American law has not been
with respect to the rules of substantive law, but rather with respect to the enforcing machinery, which too often makes the best
of rules nugatory in action. Municipal courts in a few of our larger
cities are beginning to relieve this situation. But taking the country as a whole, it is so obvious that we have almost ceased to remark
it, that in petty causes, that is with respect to the everyday
rights and wrongs of the great majority of an urban community, the
machinery whereby rights are secured, practically defeats rights by
naking it impracticable to assert them when they are infringed.
Many causes have contributed to this neglect of provision for
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petty litigation which disgraces American justice. Two of them at
least are attributable to the conditions of pioneer justice. One
has been noticed in another connection, namely, that we have had
to work out a body of substantive law for large causes and small
alike in an age of rapid growth and rapid change. Hence we have
studied the nmking of law sedulously. For more than a century in
this country we have been engaged in developing in judicial experience a body of principles and a body of rules as deductions
therefrom to accord as nearly as may be with the requirements of
justice. This is true especially of that most important part of our
law which is to be found in the reports of adjudicated cases.
Almost the whole energy of our judicial system has been, employed
in working out a consistent, logical, minutely precise body of precedents. But while our eyes have been fixed upon the abstract
rules, which are but the means of achieving justice, the results
which we obtain every day in actual causes have escaped
our attention. If the dilatory machinery of enforcement succeeds
finally in applying the principle to the cause, we may be assured
that in the very great majority of causes the result will be what it
should be. But our failure to devote equal attention to application
and enforcement of law has too often allowed the machinery designed to give effect to legal rules to defeat the end of law in its actual
operation. The other cause referred to is that our procedure,
as has been seen, was largely determined by the conditions of rural
communities of seventy-five or one hundred years ago. Hence
when better provision for petty causes is urged, many repeat the
stock saying that litigation ought to be discouraged. It will not
do to say to the population of modern cities that the practical cutting off of all petty litigation, by which theoretically the rights of
the average man are to be maintained, is a good thing because
litigation ought to be discouraged. Litigation for the sake of litigation ought to be discouraged. But this is the only form of petty
litigation which survives the discouragements involved in American judicial organization and procedure. In truth, the idea that
litigation is to be discouraged, proper enough, in so far as it refers
to amicable adjustment of what ought to be so adjuited, has its
roots chiefly in the obvious futility of litigation under the conditions of.procedure which have obtained in the immediate past. It
is much more appropriate to frontier and rural communities where
a law suit was a game and a trial a spectacle than to modem
urban communities. Moreover, there is danger that in discourag-
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ing litigation we encourage wrongdoing, and it requires very little
experience in the legal aid societies in any of our cities to teach
us that we have been doing that very thing. Of all peoples in the
world, we ought to have been the most solicitous for the rights of
the poor, no matter how petty the causes in which they are to be
vindicated. Unhappily, except as the organization of municipal
courts in recent years has been bringing about a change, we have
been callous to the just claims of this class of controversies.
Application and enforcement of law are regarded as the central
questions in modern legal science. These questions are especially
acute in the United States because our polity has committed so
much to courts that elsewhere is left to the executive and legislative departments. They are especially acute in American cities
because in these cities the demands made of the courts increase
continually. In these communities, the Puritan conception of law
as a guide to the conscience and the pioneer conception that the
courts exist chiefly to work out rules for a new country are wholly
inadequate. The pioneer conception of enforcement through individual initiative is even more inadequate. Both the law and the
agencies that administer the law, shaped by such conceptions, are
unequal to the burden put upon them by the circumstances of city
life and the modern feeling in a busy community that law is a
product of conscious and determinate human will. This is the
more apparent in application and enforcement of law in a heterogeneous community. Under the influence of the theory of natural
rights and of the actual equality in pioneer society, American common law assumed that there were no classes and that normally men
dealt with one another on equal terms and at arm's length; so that
courts at the end of the nineteenth century were loth to admit, if
they would admit at all, the validity of legislation which recognized
the classes that do in fact exist in our industrial society and the inequality in point of fact that may exist in bargainings between
them. It assumed also that every normal part of the community
was zealous to maintain its rights and would take the initiative
in doing so. Not a little friction has resulted from application of
rules based upon this theoretical equality in communities divided
into classes with divergent interests. A great deal of ineffectiveness has come from application of common-law principles, developed to an extreme in adapting them to pioneer communities, to
elements of the city population which do not understand our individualism and our tenderness of individual liberty, and from
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reliance upon individual initiative in case of other elements which
by instinct and training are suspicious of authority and of magistrates. Mr. Train's book, Crime, Criminals and the Camorra, shows
vividly how fear of courts, bred of conditions in another land, may
lead immigrants to tolerate gross oppression rather than to go to
the law for relief.
Finally the social workers in our cities have had to wrestle with
the problem of freeing administration from the rigid limitations
imposed in the last century. The attempt to confine administrative
action within the narrowest possible limits gave us at the end of the
nineteenth century a multitude of rules which hindered as against
few which helped. Regulation of public utilities, factory inspection, food inspection, tenement-house inspection and building laws
have compelled us to turn more and more from the criminal law
to the administrative supervision and prevention which the pioneer abhorred. So thoroughly did he hamper administration that
the reaction has given rise to a real danger that we go too far in
the opposite direction and withdraw such matters wholly from the
domain of law. The pioneer's public and administrative law cannot endure. We must work over the whole along new lines.
Reviewing the influence of the pioneer upon our law, it may be
conceded that we owe not a little to the vigorous good sense of the
judges who made over the common law of England for our pioneer
communities. Science might have sunk into pedantry where strong
sense gave to America a practical system in which the traditional
principles were made to work in a new environment. On the other
hand this rapid development of law in a pioneer environment left
a bad mark on our administration of justice. The descendants of
the frontiersman have been slow to learn that democracy is not
necessarily a synonym of vulgarity and provincialism; that the
court of a sovereign people may be surrounded by dignity which is
the dignity of that people; that order and decorum conduce to
the dispatch of judicial business, while disorder and easy-going
familiarity retard it; that a counsellor at law may be a gentleman
with fine professional feeling without being a member of a privileged caste; that a trial may be an agency of justice among a free
people without being a forensic gladiatorial show; that a judge
may be an independent, experienced, expert specialist without be,
ing a tyrant. In the federal courts and in an increasing number of
the states something has been done to secure the dignity of judicial
tribunals. But the country over there is still much to do. Not the
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least factor in making courts and bar efficient agencies for justice
will be restoration of common-law ideals and deliverance of both
from the yoke of crudity and coarseness which the frontier sought
to impose on them.
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